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Alan S. Kaplinsky and Mark J. Levin*

Consumer Financial Services Arbitration: What
Does the Future Hold After Concepcion?

I.

Introduction

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was enacted in 1925 to overcome a longentrenched judicial hostility towards arbitration, and it established a liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration that is applicable in both federal and state courts.1
Arbitration has played a special role in resolving disputes between consumers and
companies. As the United States Supreme Court itself emphasized, “Congress, when
enacting [the FAA], had the needs of consumers, as well as others, in mind.”2 The
legislative history of the FAA reveals that its drafters believed that “the Act, by
avoiding ‘the delay and expense of litigation,’ will appeal ‘to big business and little
business alike, . . . corporate interests [and] individuals.’ Indeed, arbitration’s
advantages often would seem helpful to individuals, say, complaining about a
product, who need a less expensive alternative to litigation.”3
The importance of arbitration as an alternative to court litigation for resolving
disputes, including disputes between a consumer and a company, is reflected in
hundreds of judicial opinions that define and refine the role played by arbitration in
American society. The Supreme Court alone has issued more than thirty significant
opinions dealing with arbitration.4
© 2013 Alan S. Kaplinsky, Mark J. Levin
* Alan S. Kaplinsky and Mark J. Levin are partners with Ballard Spahr LLP in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Mr. Kaplinsky is the Chair of the firm’s Consumer Financial Services Group, and Mr. Levin is a member of the
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1. Pub. L. No. 68–401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2006)); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
2. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) (citing S. REP. NO. 69-536, at 3
(1924)).
3. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 69-536, at 3 (1924) and citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-542, at 13 (1982)).
4. See, e.g., Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012); Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v.
Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012); KPMG
LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23 (2011); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Rent-A-Center,
W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010);

Journal of Business & Technology Law

345

Consumer Financial Services Arbitration
In addition, over the course of time, consumer arbitration agreements have
evolved from short, one-paragraph general provisions to multi-page, detailed
agreements filled with consumer-friendly features which make arbitration more
beneficial to the consumer than court litigation.5 Such features include: contractual
fee-shifting to the company of attorney and expert fees, if the consumer prevails;
company payment of arbitration fees, whether or not the consumer prevails;
preservation of all substantive rights and remedies the consumer would have in
litigation; an unfettered right of the consumer to opt-out of arbitration within some
reasonable period of time after the arbitration provision becomes effective if he or
she chooses; establishment of the venue of any arbitration hearing near the
consumer’s residence; and a provision requiring the company to pay a specific
amount (typically $7,500 or $10,000) to the consumer (plus fees and costs
otherwise payable) if the arbitrator finds it liable for the amount demanded by the
6
consumer prior to the initiation of the arbitration.
Nevertheless, many courts, plaintiffs’ class action lawyers, and consumer
advocacy groups vigorously resisted the enforcement of consumer arbitration
agreements, particularly those containing class action waivers.7 Recently, in the

14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009); Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009); Hall St. Assocs.,
LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); Citizens Bank v. Alafabco,
Inc., 539 U.S. 52 (2003); PacifiCare Health Sys. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
537 U.S. 79 (2002); EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002); Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105
(2001); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681
(1996); First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52
(1995); Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. 265; Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20; Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Perry
v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 460 U.S. 1; Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S.
448 (1957); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
5. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly” Arbitration
Clauses After AT&T Mobility vs. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 853–57 (2012) (noting that
arbitration clauses increasingly “promise to pick up the tab for all initiation fees, deposits, and costs of the
arbitral proceeding”). Compare Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 4–5 (discussing a short “broad
arbitration clause” that makes no mention of the party that drafted the clause paying for any arbitration costs),
with Verizon Wireless Customer Agreement Arbitration Clause (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.proandcontracts.com/
wp-content/uploads/2011/09/2011.09.08-Verizon-Wireless-Arbitration-Clause.pdf (a more recent, two-page
arbitration agreement that indicates Verizon will pay costs of arbitration).
6. See Gilles, supra note 5, at 853–57 (2012) (noting the increase of fee-shifting provisions); see also, e.g.,
What if I Am not Satisfied with the Resolution AT&T Offers Me for a Problem I Am Experiencing?, AT&T
WIRELESS, http://www.att.com/esupport/article.jsp?sid=47114&cv=820&_requestid=1349995#fbid=if9D_7mjrR4
(last visited Mar. 16, 2013) (declaring, among other things, that AT&T will pay filing, administration and
arbitrator fees for arbitration commenced by the consumer).
7. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 632–36 (2012) (noting two principal legal challenges to class action waivers:
state law unconscionability and vindication of federal statutory rights). A class action waiver is an agreement
that neither party will participate in a class action in court or in arbitration with respect to any claim that is
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landmark case of AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the FAA preempts state laws that refuse to enforce consumer arbitration
agreements containing class action waivers on unconscionability or public policy
grounds.8 Shortly thereafter, in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, the Court
once again reinforced that “[s]tate and federal courts must enforce the Federal
Arbitration Act . . . with respect to all arbitration agreements covered by that
statute.”9 Most recently, in Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC v. Howard, the Court
reinforced that the FAA is “the Supreme Law of the Land” and once the Court has
interpreted the FAA, “it is the duty of other courts to respect that understanding of
the governing rule of law.”10
While in theory Concepcion, Marmet, and Nitro-Lift should have been the last
word on the subject, in reality, consumer arbitration is presently at a crossroads.
Some courts, and many class action lawyers and consumer advocacy groups, have
continued to try to devise ways to evade the Supreme Court’s edicts.11 In particular,
there has been an effort to create a significant exception to Concepcion that would
refuse to enforce a consumer arbitration agreement that prevents consumers from
vindicating their alleged statutory rights.12 That issue has now reached the U.S.
Supreme Court, which is poised to decide it in the spring of 2013.13 Moreover,
consumer arbitration is currently under the microscope of the federal Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which has the power under certain conditions
proscribed in Section 1028 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
subject to arbitration. See William M. Howard, Annotation, Validity of Arbitration Clause Precluding Class
Actions, 13 A.L.R. 6th 145 (2006). For examples of class action waivers, see, e.g., Lowry v. JP Morgan Chase
Bank, N.A., No. 4:12CV00816, 2012 WL 3988997, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 11, 2012); Bradberry v. T-Mobile
USA, Inc., No. C06-6567 CW, 2007 WL 1241936, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2007).
8. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
9. 132 S. Ct. at 1202.
10. Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2012) (internal quotation omitted).
11. Shortly after Concepcion was decided, the consumer advocacy group Public Justice created a blueprint
on how to attack consumer arbitration provisions in the aftermath of Concepcion. See Leslie Bailey & Paul
Bland, How Courts Can and Should Limit AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, PUBLIC JUSTICE,
http://publicjustice.net/ConcepcionMemo (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). Also, an organization named Consumers
Count, according to the press release announcing its formation, has the goal of eliminating the use of consumer
arbitration. Press Release, Consumers Count, New Consumer Advocacy Group, Consumers Count, Formed to
Restore Individuals’ Constitutional Right to Take Grievances Against Corporations to Court (Oct. 3, 2012),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/new-consumer-advocacy-group-consumers-count-formed-to-restoreindividuals-constitutional-right-to-take-grievances-against-corporations-to-court-2012-10-03.
Consumers
Count’s co-founders say in the release that the organization “is designed to turn arbitration into an unexpected
nightmare for corporations” by inundating companies with mass individual arbitrations that will be so
burdensome that companies will “disavow arbitration.” Id. Some courts have also attempted to side-step
Concepcion by purporting to find the arbitration provision unconscionable under state law for reasons other
than the class action waiver itself. See, e.g., Brewer v. Miss. Title Loans, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 486, 487 (Mo. 2012) (en
banc), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 191 (2012).
12. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 667 F.3d 204, 219 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct.
594 (2012) (discussed infra Part III).
13. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (granting certiorari to Am. Express Co.,
667 F.3d 204).
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Protection Act to significantly curtail, if not totally eliminate, the use of arbitration
provisions in consumer agreements.14 After discussing Concepcion, this Article
examines these post-Concepcion developments in more detail.

II.

The Road to Concepcion

Over the years, the Supreme Court, recognizing the many benefits that flow from
the use of arbitration to resolve disputes, has taken special pains to protect the FAA
from its detractors. In particular, the Court has held that: (a) the FAA applies in
state as well as federal courts15 and preempts inconsistent state laws;16 (b) arbitration
cannot be discriminated against or singled out for special treatment;17 (c) an
arbitration provision must be enforced as written,18 even though arbitration is more
informal than, and does not permit as much discovery as, court proceedings;19 (d)
an arbitration provision must be enforced even if piecemeal litigation is the result;20
(e) enforcement of an arbitration provision cannot be denied based upon
speculation;21 (f) an arbitration provision must be enforced even if the contract in
which it is contained is alleged to be unlawful or void ab initio;22 and (g) an
arbitration cannot proceed on a class basis unless there is affirmative evidence that
both parties so intended.23
14. Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 1028, 124 Stat. 1376, 2003–05 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (2006 &
Supp. V 2011)).
15. Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1202 (2012) (“State and federal courts
must enforce the Federal Arbitration Act. . .”) (per curiam).
16. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 3 (1984) (“In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as
well as federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of
arbitration agreements.”).
17. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996) (“Congress precluded States from singling
out arbitration provisions for suspect status, requiring instead that such provisions be placed ‘upon the same
footing as other contracts.’” (quoting Sherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974))).
18. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478–79
(1989).
19. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (“[B]y agreeing to arbitrate, a party
‘trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and
expedition of arbitration.’” (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985))).
20. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 (1983) (“Under the
Arbitration Act, an arbitration agreement must be enforced notwithstanding the presence of other persons who
are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement.”).
21. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000) (“The ‘risk’ that Randolph will
be saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement.”).
22. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 446 (2006) (“[W]e conclude that because
respondents challenge the Agreement, but not specifically its arbitration provisions, those provisions are
enforceable apart from the remainder of the contract.”); see also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967) (“[T]he federal court is instructed to order arbitration to proceed once it is
satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply (with the arbitration
agreement) is not in issue. . . . But the statutory language does not permit the federal court to consider claims of
fraud in the inducement of the contract generally.” (internal quotations omitted)).
23. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010).
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It was against this rich backdrop of arbitration decisions that the Supreme Court
decided Concepcion. The case arose out of a dispute over $30.22.24 AT&T advertised
that its phone was free, but it charged $30.22 in sales tax based on the phone’s full
retail value.25 It was promptly sued in a class action for false advertising and fraud.26
There was an arbitration provision with a class action waiver in the wireless service
agreement between AT&T and its customers, and AT&T moved to compel
arbitration.27 AT&T contended that any arbitration had to take place on an
individual, not a classwide, basis because the arbitration provision stated that the
arbitrator did not have authority to conduct class arbitration.28
AT&T’s arbitration provision also had a number of consumer-friendly features.
For example, the consumer paid no arbitration costs unless the claim was deemed
frivolous by the arbitrator;29 regardless of the amount of the consumer’s claim,
AT&T had to pay the consumer a minimum of $7,500 (now, $10,000), plus double
attorneys’ fees if the arbitrator awarded the consumer more than AT&T’s final
settlement offer before an arbitrator was appointed (known as a “bump-up”
clause);30 the arbitrator was authorized to award any form of individual relief
(including punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, and injunctive relief) that would be
available to consumers in court;31 AT&T waived any right to recover its own
attorneys’ fees from the consumer regardless of the outcome of the arbitration;32
arbitration took place in the county where the consumer resided;33 for claims under
$10,000, the consumer could choose whether arbitration will be in person, by
telephone, or on written submission;34 the American Arbitration Association
(AAA), which for more than a decade has rigorously adhered to consumer due
process protocols requiring fairness in arbitrations between consumers and
companies, was named as the administrator;35 and consumers and their attorneys
were not required to keep arbitration results confidential, and could bring issues to
the attention of government enforcement agencies.36
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1744–45.
Id. at 1744.
Id.
Id.; What if I Am not Satisfied with the Resolution AT&T Offers Me for a Problem I Am Experiencing?,
supra note 6.
31. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744 (2011).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 59a, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893) (providing AT&T’s
original contract, which states arbitrations “will be administered by the AAA”); AM. ARBITRATION ASSOC.,
CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL 34 (2007), available at http://www.adr.org/cs/idcplg?IdcService=GET_FILE
&dDocName=ADRSTG_005014&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased.
36. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 35, at 6.
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The federal district court reluctantly denied AT&T’s motion to compel
arbitration based on the “Discover Bank Rule,” so-called because it is derived from
the California Supreme Court opinion in Discover Bank v. Superior Court.37 Under
the Discover Bank Rule, a class action waiver is unconscionable when it is: (1)
“found in a consumer contract of adhesion” drafted by a party with superior
bargaining power, (2) in a setting in which “disputes between the contracting
parties predictably involve small amounts of damages,” and (3) “alleged that the
party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately
cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money.”38
The district court found that AT&T established that the Concepcions could
vindicate their rights in an individual arbitration.39 However, AT&T did not show
that bilateral arbitration was an adequate substitute for the deterrent effects of a
class action.40 The court found that the Plaintiffs “were better off” individually
pursuing their claims in arbitration because their net recovery would probably be
larger and more quickly paid than in a class action.41 But it concluded that it had to
faithfully adhere to California’s policy of favoring class litigation and class
arbitration because only a class action would protect the thousands of putative class
members who did not even know that their rights were violated.42
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court after holding that there
was no FAA preemption.43 The Ninth Circuit found that the FAA did not expressly
preempt the Discover Bank Rule because that Rule did not single out arbitration for
special treatment.44 The court observed that all class action waivers, whether within
or outside an arbitration provision, are unconscionable under California law.45 It
further concluded that the FAA also did not implicitly preempt the Discover Bank
Rule because the Rule did not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of
Congress’ two objectives in the FAA.46 According to the Ninth Circuit, those two
objectives were (1) placing arbitration agreements on the same footing as other
contracts, and (2) promoting the efficient and expeditious resolution of claims.47
That set the stage for Supreme Court review. AT&T’s certiorari petition raised
the following question: “Whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts states from
37. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 (citing Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL
5216255, at *12–13 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008)); see also Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110
(2005) (establishing the “Discover Bank Rule”).
38. Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1211 (11th Cir. 2011).
39. Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *12.
40. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 (citing Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *14).
41. Id. at 1753 (citing Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *12).
42. See Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *13–14.
43. Laster v. AT&T Mobility, 584 F.3d 849, 859 (2009).
44. Id. at 857 (citing Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Serv. Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 987 (2007)).
45. Id. at 857–59 (citing Shroyer, 498 F.3d at 990).
46. Id. at 859.
47. Id. at 857.
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conditioning the enforcement of an arbitration agreement on the availability of
particular procedures — here, classwide arbitration — when those procedures are
not necessary to ensure that the parties to the arbitration agreement are able to
vindicate their claims.”48
The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, and joined in by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy and Thomas (who also wrote a separate
concurring opinion), emphasized that under Section 2 of the FAA, an agreement to
arbitrate is “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”49 The Court held that Section 2
of the FAA preempts the Discover Bank Rule classifying most class action waivers as
unconscionable.50 According to the Court, Section 2’s savings clause does not
preserve state law defenses that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
FAA’s objectives.51
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, Justice Scalia identified a third objective of the
FAA, which he described as the “principal purpose” of the FAA: ensuring that
arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.52 The Discover Bank
Rule required that class arbitration be made available as a condition of enforcing
the arbitration agreement — i.e., either the parties agree to class arbitration or they
get no arbitration at all.53 But the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with
the fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent
with the parties’ contractual agreement and the FAA.
The Court reiterated a point previously made in Stolt-Nielson v. AnimalFeeds
Int’l Corp. that class arbitration (unless affirmatively consented to by both parties)
is patently inconsistent with the FAA.54 In Stolt-Nielson, the Court held that
ordering class arbitration when the arbitration provision is silent on the subject of
class arbitration is inconsistent with and forbidden by the FAA:
Classwide arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating additional and
different procedures and involving higher stakes. Confidentiality becomes
more difficult. And while it is theoretically possible to select an arbitrator
with some expertise relevant to the class-certification question, arbitrators
are not generally knowledgeable in the often-dominant procedural aspects
of certification, such as the protection of absent parties.55

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893).
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
Id. at 1753.
Id. at 1748.
Id. (quoting Volt Info. Sci. Inc., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1988)).
Id. at 1750.
Id. at 1750–51; see also Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010).
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750.
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Justice Scalia confronted head-on the fact that “unconscionability” is a state law
contract defense that typically applies to contracts generally and not just arbitration
agreements:
When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of
claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by
the FAA. . . . But the inquiry becomes more complex when a doctrine
normally thought to be generally applicable, such as duress or, as relevant
here, unconscionability, is alleged to have been applied in a fashion that
disfavors arbitration. In Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 . . . (1987), . . . we
noted that the FAA’s preemptive effect might extend even to grounds
traditionally thought to exist ‘at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.56
He concluded that: “Although § 2’s saving clause preserves generally applicable
contract defenses, it does not suggest an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand
as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”57
The Court expressed concern about the slippery slope that an affirmance of the
Ninth Circuit would have created.58 For example, could a state say that the same
discovery permitted by courts must also be permitted in arbitration?59 Or that court
rules such as the Federal Rules of Evidence must also be used in arbitration?60 Or
that juries must be permitted to resolve disputes whether in court or in
arbitration?61 If all it takes to be within the savings clause is for a state law rule to
purport to apply to contracts generally, Justice Scalia reasoned, then the savings
clause exception would swallow the FAA.62 He recognized that some things that
sound like they apply to both arbitration clauses and contracts generally actually
have a disproportionate impact on arbitration and are an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the FAA’s purposes.63 Notably, the majority in Concepcion
rejected the dissenters’ argument that enforcement of the class action waiver might
cause some small-dollar consumer claims to escape judicial review:

56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 1747.
Id. at 1743.
Id. at 1747.
Id. (questioning whether courts could find “unconscionable or unenforceable as against public policy
consumer arbitration agreements that fail to provide for judicially monitored discovery”).
60. Id.
61. Id. (“The same argument might apply to a rule classifying as unconscionable arbitration agreements . . .
that disallow an ultimate disposition by a jury . . . .”).
62. Id. at 1748 (“Although § 2’s saving clause preserves generally applicable contract defenses, nothing in it
suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s
objectives.”).
63. Id.
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The dissent claims that class proceedings are necessary to prosecute
small-dollar claims that might otherwise slip through the legal system . . . .
But States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA,
even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons. Moreover, the claim here was
most unlikely to go unresolved. As noted earlier, the arbitration agreement
provides that AT&T will pay claimants a minimum of $ 7,500 and twice
their attorney’s fees if they obtain an arbitration award greater than
AT&T’s last settlement offer.64

III. Is there a Vindication of Rights Exception
to Concepcion?
As discussed, Concepcion held that the FAA preempts “generally applicable contract
defenses” if they “stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s
objectives.”65 It then held that “[r]equiring the availability of classwide arbitration
interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme
inconsistent with the FAA.”66 Nevertheless, plaintiffs sometimes argue that even
after Concepcion, they should be allowed to attempt to prove, through discovery or
the presentation of factual evidence, that they cannot vindicate their rights in an
individual arbitration. Most (but not all) courts have seen this for what it is — an
attempt to make an end-run around Concepcion.67
Thus, the Third, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have all held that there is no
“vindication of rights” exception to Concepcion. In Litman v. Cellco Partnership, the
Third Circuit initially followed the New Jersey Supreme Court’s holding in
Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehobeth Beach that class action arbitration waivers
“functionally exculpate wrongful conduct,” and hence are unenforceable.68 On
remand after Concepcion, the Third Circuit did a complete turn-about and held that
“the rule established by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Muhammad is preempted
by the FAA.”69
Subsequently, in Homa v. American Express, the Third Circuit held that the
district court properly enforced a class action waiver and compelled individual
arbitration “notwithstanding the factual record in this case establishing that
[Homa] could not effectively vindicate his substantive statutory rights under
[American Express’s] arbitration agreement.”70 Homa had compiled a substantial
evidentiary record, including “Homa’s deposition, numerous attorneys’
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 1753.
Id. at 1748.
Id.
See infra Part III.
Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 655 F.3d 225, 228 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of
Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912 A.2d 88, 100 (N.J. 2006)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1046 (2012).
69. Id. at 231.
70. No. 11-3600, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 17763, at *9 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 2012) (brackets in original).
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certifications, exhibits, and a certification of a vice president of American Express.”71
Homa contended that “‘the uncontradicted evidentiary record in this case
establishes that enforcing [American Express’s] arbitration clause would make it
impossible for any person . . . to effectively vindicate his substantive statutory
rights.’”72 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit held that, even accepting Homa’s
argument to be true, individual arbitration was required under the FAA and
Concepcion: “Even if Homa cannot effectively prosecute his claim in an individual
arbitration that procedure is his only remedy, illusory or not . . . . Though some
persons might regard our result as unfair, 9 U.S.C. § 2 requires that we reach it.”73
In Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, Plaintiffs argued that the arbitration clause’s
class action waiver was “unenforceable because it would exculpate ATTM from
liability under state law . . . .”74 Plaintiffs also argued that “attorneys will refuse to
represent ATTM customers for these legally complex but small-value claims” absent
a class.75 Noting that Concepcion “specifically rejected this public policy argument,”
the Eleventh Circuit held that the FAA preempted state law.76 To the extent that
Florida law:
[W]ould invalidate the class waiver simply because the claims are of small
value, the potential claims are numerous, and many customers might not
know about or pursue their potential claims absent class procedures, such a
state policy stands as an obstacle to the FAA’s objective of enforcing
arbitration agreements according to their terms, and is preempted.77
Cruz also rejected the Plaintiffs’ attempt to circumvent Concepcion by proffering
the affidavits of three Florida consumer law attorneys who attested that they would
not represent consumers on an individual basis in claims like the Plaintiffs’ and
statistics showing that only an “infinitesimal” number of customers had
commenced arbitrations against Cingular.78 The Eleventh Circuit held that “faithful
adherence to Concepcion” required the rejection of such evidence because it “goes
only to substantiating the very public policy arguments that were expressly rejected
by the Supreme Court in Concepcion — namely, that the class action waiver will be

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
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Id. at *4–5.
Id. at *5 (brackets and ellipses in original).
Id. at *13 (internal citation omitted).
648 F.3d 1205, 1212 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id. at 1212–13.
Id. at 1213.
Id. at 1214.
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exculpatory, because most of these small-value claims will go undetected and
unprosecuted.”79
In Coneff v. AT & T Corp., Plaintiffs argued that Concepcion did not apply to “a
sufficiently narrow, fact-based state-law rule for voiding class-action waivers.”80 The
Ninth Circuit held that Concepcion “forecloses this argument,” because the majority
opinion “expressly rejected” the argument that “the class action waiver will be
exculpatory, because most of these small-value claims will go undetected and
unprosecuted.”81
Splitting with these circuits, the Second Circuit, in American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant, ruled that an arbitration agreement is unenforceable when
“plaintiffs are able to demonstrate that the practical effect of enforcement would be
to preclude their ability to vindicate their federal statutory rights.”82 In American
Express, the Plaintiffs argued that due to an anomaly in the federal antitrust laws,
they would not be able to recover the hundreds of thousands or even millions of
dollars in costs that would be required to present expert testimony, even if they
prevailed on the merits of their claims.83 The subsequent denial of American
Express’ motion for en banc review spurred vigorous dissents by the Second
Circuit’s Chief Judge and four other judges.84
The dissenters’ voices were heard by the Supreme Court, which on November 9,
2012, granted American Express’ petition for writ of certiorari.85 The Court agreed
to decide the question: “Whether the Federal Arbitration Act permits courts,
invoking the ‘federal substantive law of arbitrability,’ to invalidate arbitration
agreements on the ground that they do not permit class arbitration of a federal-law
claim.”86 Justice Sonia Sotomayor took no part in the order granting certiorari,

79. Id. at 1214. Even prior to Concepcion, numerous courts, pointing to the ability of a prevailing plaintiff
to recover attorneys’ fees and costs under fee-shifting provisions that are contained in most consumer
protection statutes, rejected such attorney certifications proffered by plaintiffs to try to establish that they
cannot vindicate his or her rights in an individual arbitration. See, e.g., Fay v. New Cingular Wireless, PCS, LLC,
No. 4:10CV883 HEA, 2010 WL 4905698, at *3 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (enforcing arbitration clause despite affidavit
from Plaintiff’s counsel that neither he nor any other attorney would take the individual case, because the
theory “is clearly negated by the ability of the customer to receive attorneys’ fees”); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat’l
Assoc. ND, 693 N.W.2d 918, 926 (N.D. 2005) (rejecting affidavit of Plaintiff’s lawyer because it did not prove
that “no attorney would be willing to accept such cases, particularly where attorney fees are available for
prevailing plaintiffs”); Billups v. Bankfirst, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1274 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (rejecting affidavits of
lawyers that class action was necessary to prosecute claim, because it was “based on the erroneous assumption
that her costs and attorney’s fees will be paid from her damage award” instead of from statutory attorneys’ fees);
Taylor v. Citibank USA, N.A., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1342–43 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (same).
80. Coneff v. AT & T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2012).
81. Id. (quoting Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1214 (11th Cir. 2011)).
82. 667 F.3d 204, 212 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012).
83. Am. Express, 667 F.3d at 212.
84. In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2012).
85. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012).
86. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Am. Express, 667 F.3d 204 (No. 12-133).

Vol. 8, No. 2 2013

355

Consumer Financial Services Arbitration
probably because she was a member of the Second Circuit panel that heard the case
in an earlier appeal.87
There is a very strong argument that American Express was wrongly decided. In
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, the Supreme Court articulated a stringent test for
determining whether Congress intended for federal statutory claims to be excepted
from the FAA.88 The Ninth Circuit had held that because the federal Credit Repair
Organizations Act (CROA) has a “right to sue” clause, Congress must have
intended to permit consumers to sue in court; therefore, CROA claims cannot be
arbitrated.89 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that that if Congress had
intended to prohibit the enforcement of arbitration agreements in CROA, it could
have said so explicitly, as it has done in certain other statutes.90 “Because CROA is
silent on whether claims under the Act can proceed in an arbitrable forum,” the
Court said, “the FAA requires the arbitration agreement to be enforced according to
its terms.”91 In American Express, the Second Circuit acknowledged that “the
Sherman Act does not provide plaintiffs with an express right to bring their claims
as a class in court.”92 Therefore, it does not pass the strict test laid down by the
Supreme Court in Greenwood for interpreting congressional intent. Whether the
Supreme Court follows such an argument in Italian Colors, or takes a different tack,
should be known before the current term is over in the Spring of 2013. Oral
argument was held on February 27, 2013.93

IV. Will Congress and the CFPB Override Concepcion?
Regardless of the ultimate outcome of Italian Colors, a potential threat to the use of
class action waivers in consumer arbitration agreements is action by the CFPB.
Several parts of the Dodd-Frank Act affect consumer arbitration, among them
Section 1028, which requires the CFPB to “conduct a study of, and shall provide a
report to Congress concerning, the use of agreements providing for arbitration of
any future dispute between covered persons and consumers in connection with the
offering or providing of consumer financial products or services.”94 It further
provides that the CFPB “by regulation, may prohibit or impose conditions or
limitations on the use of [such] an agreement . . . if the Bureau finds that such a

87. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 594; In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig, 554 F.3d 300, 302 (2d Cir. 2009),
vacated, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010).
88. 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012); id. at 672–73.
89. Id. at 669.
90. Id. at 675.
91. Id.
92. In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 213 n.5 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594
(2012).
93. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 594.
94. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, §1028, 124 Stat.
1376, 2003–05 (2010).
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prohibition or imposition of conditions or limitations is in the public interest and
for the protection of consumers.”95
On April 24, 2012, the CFPB announced that it had initiated its study of
consumer arbitration.96 It submitted to the Federal Register for publication a
“Request for Information Regarding Scope, Methods, and Data Sources for
Conducting Study of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements.”97 The CFPB described
the Request as “a preliminary step in undertaking the study.”98
The Request asked the public to submit comments on or before June 23, 2012,
on four main topics dealing with the scope, methodology and data sources of the
study: (1) the prevalence of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer
financial services products (other than credit card agreements, on which the CFPB
already has data); (2) claims brought by consumers against financial services
companies in arbitration; (3) claims brought by financial services companies against
consumers in arbitration; and (4) the impact of pre-dispute arbitration agreements
on consumers outside particular arbitral proceedings.99
The Request stated that comments were to be limited to the appropriate scope of
the study, as well as appropriate methods and sources of data for conducting the
study.100 It further stated that the CFPB was not seeking comments at this time on
whether it should exercise its rulemaking authority or whether any regulations
would serve to protect consumers or be in the public interest.101
On June 22, 2012, your authors submitted extensive comments on behalf of the
American Bankers Association, the Consumer Bankers Association and The
Financial Roundtable.102 Many of the companies that comprise those organizations
have arbitration provisions in their consumer contracts and have found arbitration
to be an efficient and cost-effective manner of resolving disputes and maintain
customer goodwill.103 They believe that arbitration offers consumers and companies
greater benefits than either individual or class action litigation, and that those
benefits — which include streamlined proceedings, informality, reduced cost and

95.
96.

Id.
Press Release, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Launches Inquiry into Arbitration Clauses (Apr. 24, 2012), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
pressreleases/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-launches-public-inquiry-into-arbitration-clauses/.
97. Request for Information Regarding Scope, Methods, and Data Sources for Conducting Study of PreDispute Arbitration Agreements, 77 Fed. Reg. 25,148, 25,149–50 (Apr. 27, 2012).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 25,149.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Nessa Feddis et al., Comments on Request for Information Regarding Scope, Methods, and Data Sources
for Conducting Study of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements (June 22, 2012), available
at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2012-0017-0030 (CFPB Comment Letter 62212,
June 26, 2012) [hereinafter Response].
103. Id. at 2.
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speed and ease of access — have never been more important than they are in
today’s economy.104
Our comment letter urged the CFPB to study the benefits that consumers derive
from individual arbitration and to compare that to the benefits they derive from
both individual litigation and class action litigation.105 Although the CFPB’s Request
did not specifically mention “class actions,” they cannot be divorced from an
examination of consumer arbitration.106 In particular, we urged the CFPB to study:
(a) whether class actions provide meaningful benefits to the individual
consumers as compared with individual arbitration in terms of
outcomes, duration, costs, ease of access and consumer satisfaction;107
(b) the costs and impact of class action lawsuits, including frivolous or
nuisance class action lawsuits, on consumers, businesses and the
courts;108
(c) whether class actions are an efficient cost-effective mechanism to
ensure compliance with the law given the range of enforcement powers
afforded to the Bureau and other state and federal enforcement
authorities;109
(d) the extent to which class members (as opposed to their lawyers)
actually benefit from class actions, as well as the economic impact of
class actions on businesses;110

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Many class action settlements occur not because the lawsuits have merit — indeed, many are nuisance
suits — but because of the in terrorem threat of costly and drawn-out litigation that class actions pose. And
while plaintiffs’ lawyers often rake in substantial fees, the individual class member is frequently left with a
coupon or a check for a few dollars. Id. at 9.
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(e) the fact that there is empirical proof that class actions are not
necessary for consumers to vindicate their statutory rights;111
Year
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Truth in Lending Act (TILA)
Individual Actions
539 (94% of total)
474 (93% of total)
554 (97% of total)
473 (97% of total)
671 (98% of total)
665 (95% of total)
733 (94% of total)
1,320 (97% of total)
928 (98% of total)
539 (98% of total)

TILA Class Actions
37 (6% of total)
39 (7% of total)
20 (3% of total)
19 (3% of total)
17 (2% of total)
40 (5% of total)
51 (6% of total)
40 (3% of total)
17 (2% of total)
15 (2% of total)

(f) whether the ability of the CFPB and other agencies to handle
aggregated small dollar claims is more effective than class actions in
deterring corporate misconduct;112
(g) whether class actions are not necessary to make consumers aware of
the existence of a claim;113
(h) to take into account the many types of informal dispute resolution
processes — including the error and dispute resolution procedures
111.

®

According to the LexisNexis CourtLink database, over the past decade, 93% to 98% of all TILA claims
brought in the federal courts were brought as individual actions, rather than class actions, even though TILA
expressly permits class actions to be brought. Id. at 8. That is because TILA permits a successful plaintiff to
recover his or her attorneys’ fees and costs, and thereby provides an incentive for an attorney to represent the
plaintiff in an individual action even in small dollar cases. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (2006).
112. The CFPB should study the effect of actual and threatened governmental action by the CFPB, the FTC,
the Department of Justice and state attorneys general and other enforcement agencies on corporate behavior
and whether it reduces the alleged need for class actions to encourage compliance with the law. In addition, the
CFPB should study whether the interests of consumers are better protected through actions brought by
governmental agencies, as opposed to private class action lawyers, since the former act in the public interest
while the latter have an economic stake in the case, and whether governmental agencies do a better job than the
private bar at determining and prioritizing which actions should be pursued in order to further the “public
interest.” Response, supra note 102, at 11.
113. The CFPB should study the role played in modern society by the internet and social media in alerting
consumers to alleged corporate misconduct. It should examine the impact of internet “gripe sites” frequented
by consumers and the capacity of alleged corporate wrongdoing to go “viral” on the internet and become
known immediately to consumers. It should also study the extent to which websites and databases maintained
by government enforcement agencies (including the CFPB) that encourage consumers to “tell their story” and
submit complaints help educate other consumers to particular issues and potential claims. Id.
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provided by federal and state law, those maintained internally by
businesses and those offered by regulatory agencies (including the
CFPB) and private organizations (such as the Better Business Bureau);114
(i) the extent to which consumers resolve their disputes with businesses
through online dispute resolution, which uses technology to facilitate
the resolution of disputes between parties;115
(j) to take account of the fact that most consumer arbitration
agreements in use today contain numerous consumer-friendly features
that make individual arbitration a more advantageous forum for
resolving consumer disputes than the courts;116 and
(k) whether consumers, businesses and the courts could benefit from
having debt collection disputes resolved in arbitration instead of court.117
Our comment letter to the CFPB also emphasized the numerous empirical studies
which have concluded that arbitration is more beneficial to consumers than
litigation.118
114. In the lives of consumers and in the marketplace, all of these alternative dispute resolution procedures
are inextricably intertwined and provide a necessary context for the study of consumer arbitration. Id.
115. There are companies and organizations that provide online dispute resolution services both nationally
and internationally. Understanding the extent to which consumers resolve disputes through online dispute
resolution services will help to place more traditional consumer arbitration services and other alternative
dispute resolution procedures in the proper context. Indeed, because online dispute resolution is the only
practical way of resolving international consumer disputes, curtailment of consumer arbitration by the CFPB
could throw a monkey wrench into the use of online dispute resolution and harm international transactions
over the internet. Id. at 7.
116. Id. at 14.
117. Id. at 16.
118. See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, OUTCOMES OF ARBITRATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CONSUMER LENDING
CASES (2004), available at http://www.adrforum.com/rcontrol/documents/ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/
2005ErnstAndYoung.pdf (finding that: consumers prevailed more often than businesses in cases that went to an
arbitration hearing; consumers obtained favorable results, including settlements, in 79% of reviewed cases; and
consumers surveyed were largely satisfied with the arbitration process); HARRIS INTERACTIVE, ARBITRATION:
SIMPLER, CHEAPER, AND FASTER THAN LITIGATION 5 (2005), available at http://www.adrforum.com/rcontrol/
documents/ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/2005HarrisPoll.pdf (reporting strong satisfaction with arbitration
results and process, including speed and simplicity); ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION, TASK FORCE ON A.D.R.
EFFECTIVENESS, SURVEY ON ARBITRATION (2003), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/taskforces/
adr/surveyreport.pdf (indicating that 78% of trial attorneys find arbitration faster than lawsuits and 86% of trial
attorneys find that arbitration costs are equal to or less than lawsuit costs); MICHAEL A. PERINO, REPORT TO THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION REGARDING ARBITRATOR CONFLICT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN
NASD AND NYSE SECURITIES ARBITRATIONS 35 (2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/arbconflict.pdf
(finding that 93% of consumers using arbitration find it to be fair); Mark Fellows, The Same Result as in Court,
More Efficiently: Comparing Arbitration and Court Litigation Outcomes, 14 METRO. CORP. COUNSEL 32 (2006)
(comparing “win” rates and case durations from disclosed consumer arbitration awards in California with
publicly available outcome information from the Bureau of Judicial Statistics on litigated contract cases
involving individuals in the seventy-five largest counties in the United States and concluding that (a) consumers
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In 2009, the Searle Civil Justice Institute of Northwestern University School of
Law released the first in-depth study of consumer arbitrations administered by the
AAA.119 The study, which was based on a review of 301 consumer arbitrations that
were closed by award between April and December 2007, reached the following
conclusions: (1) The upfront cost of arbitration for consumer claimants is quite low
(an average of $96 for claims less than $10,000 and $219 for claims between $10,000
and $75,000);120 (2) AAA consumer arbitration is an expeditious way to resolve
disputes (an average of 6.9 months);121 (3) Consumers won some relief in 53.3% of
the cases filed and recovered an average of $19,255 (52.1% of the amount
claimed);122 (4) No statistically significant repeat-player effect was identified using a
traditional definition of repeat-player business;123 (5) Arbitrators awarded attorneys’
fees to prevailing consumers in 63.1% of cases in which the consumer sought such
an award and the average attorneys’ fee award was $14,574;124 (6) A substantial
majority of consumer arbitration clauses (76.6%) fully complied with the AAA Due
Process Protocol;125 (7) AAA’s review of arbitration clauses for Protocol compliance
was effective (98.2% of the time) at identifying and responding to clauses with
Protocol violations;126 (8) AAA refused to administer a significant number of
consumer cases because of Protocol violations by businesses;127 (9) As a result of
AAA’s Protocol compliance review, some businesses either waive problematic
provisions or revise arbitration clauses to remove provisions that violate the
Protocol.128
A second study by the same organization, this one involving debt collection,
showed that: “[C]onsumers prevailed more often in arbitration than in court . . . .
who brought arbitration claims against businesses prevailed in 65.5% of cases, while plaintiffs litigating contract
claims in court prevailed 61.5% of the time overall, and (b) the median duration for arbitrations was 4.35
months, compared with 19.4 months for court lawsuits); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment
Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 48, 63 (1998) (concluding that employees
collectively receive 10.4% of their demand in litigation, compared with 18% in arbitration, and that “arbitration
holds the potential to make workplace justice truly available to rank-and-file employees for the first time in our
history”).
119. Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA Consumer Arbitration, 25
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOLUTION 843, 843 (2010).
120. Id. at 845. These amounts are below the levels specified in the AAA fee schedule for low-cost
arbitrations and are the result of arbitrators reallocating consumer costs to businesses. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N,
THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (AAA) OFFERS TWO FEE SCHEDULES, available at http://www.adr.org/
aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_012009 (last accessed Apr. 9, 2013).
121. Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 119, at 845.
122. Id. at 845–46.
123. Id. at 846.
124. Id.
125. Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of Consumer Arbitration 5 (University
of Kansas School of Law, Working Paper No. 2011-4, 2011).
126. Response, supra note 102, at 5.
127. Id. In 2007, AAA refused to administer at least 85 consumer cases, and likely at least 129 consumer
cases (9.4% of its case load) because the business failed to comply with the Protocol. Id.
128. Id.
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[T]he likelihood of creditors winning in arbitration is less than in court.”129 The
authors further concluded that “nothing in our study provides any evidence of
biased outcomes in arbitration.”130
The CFPB has not announced whether it will permit further public input in its
arbitration study or when the study will be completed.

V.

Conclusion

Concepcion’s validation of class action waivers in consumer arbitration agreements
was a landmark ruling, but may not have been the last word on the subject.
Observers on both sides of the class action waiver issue are eagerly awaiting the
Supreme Court’s forthcoming decision in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant and the CFPB’s release of its arbitration study.

129. Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Creditor Claims in Arbitration and in Court, 7 HASTINGS
BUS. L.J. 77, 80 (2011).
130. Id. at 83; see also Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical Research on Consumer Arbitration:
What the Data Reveals, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1051 (2009) (study based upon an analysis of data derived from
debt collection arbitrations commenced by creditors concluded that “the consumer arbitration process provides
a more pro-consumer environment for claims adjudication than does the traditional court system”).

362

Journal of Business & Technology Law

